ומודים בשאר כל האדם שזכו לו מעותיו שאין מערבין לאדם אלא מדעתו
And the Rabbis concede with regard to all other people, apart from grocers and bakers, that if one gave them money for the food of an eiruv, his money confers possession upon him, as one may establish an eiruv for a person only with his knowledge and at his bidding. With regard to a grocer or baker, the person giving the money does not intend to appoint the grocer or the baker as his agent and the money itself does not effect an acquisition, and consequently, he did not accomplish anything. With regard to anyone else, however, there is no doubt that he must have intended to appoint him his agent, and his act is effective.
אמר רבי יהודה במה דברים אמורים בעירובי תחומין אבל בעירובי חצירות מערבין לדעתו ושלא לדעתו לפי שזכין לאדם שלא בפניו ואין חבין לאדם שלא בפניו:
Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, but with regard to a joining of courtyards, one may establish an eiruv for a person either with his knowledge or without his knowledge. The reason is because one may act for a person’s benefit in his absence, but one may not act to a person’s disadvantage in his absence. As a participant in a joining of courtyards benefits from his inclusion in the eiruv, his consent is not required. However, with regard to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, although it enables one to go farther in one direction, he loses the option of traveling in the opposite direction. When an action is to a person’s disadvantage, or if it entails both benefits and disadvantages, one may act on that person’s behalf only if he has been explicitly appointed his agent.
גמ׳ מאי טעמא דרבי אליעזר הא לא משך
GEMARA: The Gemara poses a question: What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that one who gave money to a grocer or a baker has acquired possession of the food for the eiruv? This ruling is difficult, as he did not perform a transaction by pulling the food into his possession, and one can acquire an object only by performing a valid act of acquisition.
Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Abbahu said: Rabbi Eliezer established this acquisition so that it should be like the four times during the year that the payment of money effects acquisition, as we learned in a mishna: On these four times every year, on the eves of Passover, Shavuot , Rosh HaShana, and the Eighth Day of Assembly, one who paid for meat may force the butcher to slaughter an animal against his will. Even if his ox was worth a thousand dinar, and the customer has paid for only one dinar’s worth of meat, the customer may force the butcher to slaughter it, so that the buyer can receive his meat. The reason is that on these four occasions everyone buys meat, and therefore the butcher who promised to supply the customer with meat must give it to him, even if this causes the butcher a considerable loss.
לפיכך אם מת מת ללוקח מת ללוקח הא לא משך אמר רב הונא בשמשך
Therefore, if the ox died, it died at the buyer’s expense. That is to say, he must bear the loss and is not entitled to get his dinar back. The Gemara asks: Why is this so? The customer did not pull the ox into his possession. As he did not perform an act of acquisition, he has not acquired any part of the ox, and his dinar should therefore be restored to him. Rav Huna said: We are dealing here with a case where he did pull the ox into his possession.
אי הכי אימא סיפא בשאר ימות השנה אינו כן לפיכך אם מת מת למוכר אמאי הא משך
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, say the latter clause of that mishna as follows: With regard to the rest of the days of the year, it is not so. Therefore, if the animal died, it died at the seller’s expense. If, as Rav Huna claims, the mishna is referring to a case where the purchaser had already pulled the animal into his possession, why must the seller suffer the loss? Since the customer pulled it into his possession and has acquired it, the ox died in his possession.
אמר רבי שמואל בר יצחק לעולם בשלא משך הכא במאי עסקינן בשזיכה לו על ידי אחר
Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the customer did not pull the animal into his possession. With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the butcher conferred possession upon his customer by means of another person, i. e., the butcher conferred possession upon the customer by instructing another person to acquire a dinar’s worth of the ox’s meat on his behalf, without having obtained his consent.
בארבעה פרקים אלו דזכות הוא לו זכין לו שלא בפניו בשאר ימות השנה דחוב הוא לו אין חבין לו אלא בפניו
Consequently, at these four times, when it is for his benefit, as everyone wishes to buy meat on these days, one may act for his benefit in his absence, and the acquisition is valid. With regard to the rest of the days of the year, when it is to his disadvantage, as it obligates him in payment and he might have no interest in this purchase, one may act to his disadvantage only in his presence.
And Rav Ila said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: At these four times, the Sages based their statement on Torah law, i. e., they ruled in accordance with Torah law. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: By Torah law, the payment of money is an effective act of acquisition, which acquires movable property. Merchandise that is purchased with money is immediately transferred to the ownership of the buyer.
ומפני מה אמרו משיכה קונה גזירה שמא יאמר לו נשרפו חיטיך בעלייה:
And why, then, did the Sages say that the mode of acquisition of pulling, not monetary payment, acquires movable goods? It is a decree issued by the Sages, lest the seller say to a buyer who has already paid for his merchandise: Your wheat was burned in the upper story of my house, and you have lost everything. According to Torah law, once the buyer pays, he owns the merchandise wherever it is located. As this state of affairs can lead to fraud, the Sages instituted that only an act of physical transfer of the item purchased can finalize the sale. On these four occasions, however, the Sages ordained that Torah law remains in effect. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that this enactment applies to an eiruv as well.
ומודים בשאר כל האדם כו׳: מאן שאר כל אדם אמר רב בעל הבית
The mishna stated: The Rabbis concede with regard to all other people that if he gave them money for food for an eiruv, his money confers possession upon him. The Gemara asks: Who is included among all other people? Rav said: The reference is to an ordinary homeowner, not a merchant, who was asked by someone to receive possession of food for an eiruv on his behalf, by means of the money that he provided.
And likewise, Shmuel said: The reference is to an ordinary homeowner. As Shmuel said: They taught this halakha only with regard to a baker, but an ordinary homeowner may acquire the food on behalf of another person. And Shmuel also said: They taught this halakha only in a case where he gave him a ma’a, but if he gave him a utensil, he acquires the food for the eiruv by the mode of acquisition known as exchange. By handing over the utensil in exchange for the food of the eiruv, he acquires that food wherever it is located. However, one cannot perform the mode of acquisition of exchange with money.
ואמר שמואל לא שנו אלא דאמר לו זכה לי אבל אמר ערב לי שליח שויה וקני:
And Shmuel further said: They taught this halakha only in a case where he said to the grocer or baker: Confer possession upon me; but if he said to him: Establish an eiruv on my behalf, he clearly intended to appoint him his agent to establish an eiruv on his behalf, and therefore the eiruv is acquired by means of his agency.
We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement, that one may establish an eiruv only with a person’s knowledge, said? This halakha applies to a joining of Shabbat boundaries, but not a joining of courtyards. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this regard, and not only that, but any place where Rabbi Yehuda taught a halakha with regard to eiruvin, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.
Rav Ḥana from Baghdad said to Rav Yehuda: Did Shmuel state this ruling even with regard to an alleyway whose cross beam or side post was removed during Shabbat? Rabbi Yehuda maintains that it is permitted to carry in this alleyway on that same Shabbat.
אמר ליה בעירובין אמרתי לך ולא במחיצות
He said to him: I spoke to you with regard to the acquisition of eiruvin, and not with regard to partitions. The halakhot of partitions are not considered part of the halakhot of eiruvin, as they touch upon several areas of halakha, only one of which is the issue of an eiruv. With regard to partitions, the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: As it is stated that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, this proves by inference that there is a dispute concerning this issue. But didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: Any place where Rabbi Yehuda says when, or in what case is this, in the Mishna, he intends only to explain the earlier statement of the Rabbis, not to disagree with them. Why, then, did Shmuel say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, when according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi he is merely clarifying the opinion of the Rabbis, and there is no dispute between them?
ולא פליגי והא אנן תנן נתוספו עליהן מוסיף ומזכה וצריך להודיע
Before addressing this question, the Gemara expresses surprise over the claim itself: And do Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages not dispute this issue? Didn’t we learn in an earlier mishna: If new residents were added to the original residents of the alleyway, he may add to the eiruv for those residents and confer possession on them, and he must inform the new residents of their inclusion in the merging of alleyways. Apparently, this tanna maintains that one must inform them even with regard to a joining of courtyards. This ruling contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, which proves that there is at least one Sage who does not accept his opinion.
התם בחצר שבין שני מבואות
The Gemara answers: There, the mishna is referring to a courtyard situated between two alleyways, in which case the residents of the courtyard may join a merging with whichever alleyway they prefer. As their participation in the merging involves a certain disadvantage, for perhaps the residents of the courtyard would not want to establish a merging of alleyways with one alleyway and lose out on a potential merging with the other, it is necessary to inform them.
The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Didn’t Rav Sheizvi say that Rav Ḥisda said with regard to that same mishna: That is to say that Rabbi Yehuda’s colleagues disagree with him over the need to inform the other residents about the eiruv? This statement indicates that at least some Sages hold that the matter is in dispute, and not everyone agrees with Rabbi Yehuda.
Rather, the Gemara resolves both difficulties together: