פטור אדתני היה מגרר ויוצא מגרר ויוצא פטור נפלוג וניתני בדידה במה דברים אמורים בעומד לפוש אבל לכתף פטור

He would be exempt. If that is the case, rather than teaching: If he was dragging and exiting, dragging and exiting, he is exempt, let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case of carrying itself, as follows: In what case are these matters stated? It is in a case where he stopped to rest; however, if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulder, he is exempt.

אלא הא מני בן עזאי היא דאמר מהלך כעומד דמי אבל זורק מאי פטור ניפלוג [וניתני] בדידה במה דברים אמורים במהלך אבל זורק פטור

Rather, the Gemara explains why one is liable in the case where he carries the purse. In accordance with whose opinion was this halakha taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, who said: The legal status of one who walks is like that of one who stops, as each step constitutes a pause between the actions of lifting and placement. Therefore, the initial lifting is not part of the prohibited labor of carrying out. The Gemara infers: But if one throws the object into another domain, what is the halakha? He would be exempt from payment, as the lifting is the start of the prohibited labor of carrying out. If so, let the tanna distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself, without resorting to the case of dragging and exiting, as follows: In what case are these matters stated? It is in the case of one who walks, so that there is separation between lifting and carrying out, and therefore the theft and the desecration of Shabbat are not simultaneous. However, one who throws is exempt from payment, as liability for carrying out and for theft are incurred simultaneously.

מגרר ויוצא איצטריכא ליה סלקא דעתך אמינא אין דרך הוצאה בכך קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of ben Azzai, that would in fact be a more appropriate distinction; however, the case of one who was dragging and exiting was necessary for the tanna to teach because it includes a novel element, as it might enter your mind to say that this is not a typical manner of carrying out, and one is not liable to be executed for performing a prohibited labor in an atypical manner. Therefore, it teaches us that this too is a manner of carrying out.

ובמאי אי ברברבי אורחיה הוא אי בזוטרי לאו אורחיה הוא אלא במיצעי

And the Gemara asks: In what case is this so? If it is in the case of large purses, obviously dragging is its typical manner, and there is nothing novel in this. If it is in the case of small purses, dragging is certainly not its typical manner, and one would certainly not be liable. Rather, it must be referring to intermediate -sized purses. Although they are not always carried out in this manner, since they are sometimes dragged, the novelty is that he is liable for desecrating Shabbat and exempt from the payment.

ודאפקיה להיכא אי דאפקיה לרשות הרבים איסור שבת איכא איסור גניבה ליכא אי דאפקיה לרשות היחיד איסור גניבה איכא איסור שבת ליכא לא צריכא דאפקיה לצידי רשות הרבים

The Gemara continues: And in this case, to where did he carry out the pouch? If he carried it out from the owner’s private domain to the public domain, there is violation of the prohibition of Shabbat; however, there is no violation of the prohibition against theft, as one does not acquire an item by pulling it into the public domain. If he carried it out from the owner’s private domain to his own private domain, there is violation of the prohibition against theft; however, there is no violation of the prohibition of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary only in a case where he carried it out to the sides of the public domain. This is referring to the area in the public domain adjacent to the houses located on its sides, demarcated from the thoroughfare by small pegs and not by a full-fledged partition.

וכמאן אי כרבי אליעזר דאמר צידי רשות הרבים כרשות הרבים דמו איסור שבת איכא איסור גניבה ליכא אי כרבנן דאמרי צידי רשות הרבים לאו כרשות הרבים דמו איסור גניבה איכא איסור שבת ליכא

The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion is this taught? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The legal status of the sides of the public domain is like that of the public domain, there is violation of the prohibition of Shabbat; however, there is no violation of the prohibition against theft. If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said: The legal status of the sides of the public domain is not like that of the public domain, there is violation of the prohibition against theft; however, there is no violation of the prohibition of Shabbat.

לעולם כרבי אליעזר וכי אמר רבי אליעזר צידי רשות הרבים כרשות הרבים דמו הני מילי לענין חיובא דשבת דזימנין דדחקי רבים ועיילי להתם אבל לענין מיקנא קני מאי טעמא דהא לא שכיחי רבים

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and when Rabbi Eliezer said: The legal status of the sides of the public domain is like that of the public domain, that applies only with regard to the liability for performing prohibited labor on Shabbat, as occasionally the multitudes crowd and enter there. However, with regard to the matter of acquiring an object, one acquires it by dragging it there. What is the reason for this halakha? It is due to the fact that the public is not typically found there, and acquisition can be effected in a place where the multitudes are not typically found.

רב אשי אמר כגון שצירף ידו למטה משלשה וקיבלו כדרבא דאמר רבא ידו של אדם חשובה לו כארבעה על ארבעה רב אחא מתני הכי

Rav Ashi said: Actually, one is exempt when one dragged the object into the public domain in a case where he joined his hand to his other hand at a height below three handbreadths off the ground and received the purse by passing it from one hand into the other as soon as he brought it into the public domain. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: A person’s hand is considered like four by four handbreadths for him. Therefore, an object placed in one’s hand is considered placed with regard to Shabbat, and since his hand is his personal domain he has also acquired the stolen item. Rav Aḥa taught the entire discussion this way, as above.

רבינא מתני לעולם דאפקיה לרשות הרבים וברשות הרבים נמי קנה ותרוייהו בדיוקא דהא מתניתין קמיפלגי דתנן היה מושכו ויוצא ומת ברשות בעלים פטור הגביהו או שהוציאו מרשות בעלים ומת חייב

Ravina taught otherwise: Actually, it is a case where one carried out the object to the public domain, and in the public domain he also acquires the stolen object by removing it from the owner’s domain, even if he does not transfer it to his own domain. The Gemara comments: And the two of them, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to the inference of this mishna, as we learned in a mishna ( Bava Kamma 79a) with regard to one who stole an animal: If he was pulling the animal and exiting, and it died in the domain of the owner, the thief is exempt from payment because he did not yet acquire the animal and therefore did not assume liability for its death through circumstances beyond his control. If he lifted it or took it out of the owner’s domain, thereby acquiring the animal, and it died, the thief is liable to pay its value because it died in his possession.

רבינא דייק מרישא רב אחא דייק מסיפא רבינא דייק מרישא היה מושכו ויוצא ומת ברשות בעלים פטור טעמא דמת ברשות בעלים הא הוציאו מרשות בעלים ומת חייב רב אחא דייק מסיפא הגביהו או שהוציאו הוצאה דומיא דהגבהה מה הגבהה דאתי לרשותיה אף הוצאה נמי דאתי לרשותיה

Ravina inferred his conclusion from the first clause of the mishna, and Rav Aḥa inferred his conclusion from the latter clause. Ravina inferred his conclusion from the first clause: If he was pulling the animal and exiting, and it died in the domain of the owner, the thief is exempt from payment. The reason that the thief is exempt is that the animal died in the owner’s domain; by inference, if he took it out of the owner’s domain and it died, he is liable because the thief acquires the item by its very removal from the owner’s property, even to the public domain. Rav Aḥa inferred his conclusion from the latter clause of the mishna: If he lifted it or took it out of the owner’s domain, he is liable. Based on the juxtaposition of the two, taking the animal out is similar to lifting it: Just as lifting is an act of acquisition through which the animal comes into his domain, so too, taking it out is referring to a case where it comes into his domain.

לרב אחא קשיא רישא לרבינא קשיא סיפא רישא לרב אחא לא קשיא כמה דלא אתי לרשותיה רשות בעלים קרינא ביה סיפא לרבינא לא קשיא הוצאה דומיא דהגבהה לא אמרינן

The Gemara observes: For Rav Aḥa the first clause of the mishna is difficult, while for Ravina the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers: The first clause is not difficult for Rav Aḥa, as he could explain it as follows: As long as the animal has not come into one’s domain, even if it has left the owner’s property, we continue to call it the owner’s domain. Similarly, the latter clause is not difficult for Ravina, as in his opinion we do not say: Taking the animal out is similar to lifting it. Therefore, the mishna’s ruling is that the thief acquires the animal merely through its removal from the owner’s property.

הבא על אחותו ועל אחות אביו כו׳ ורמינהו אלו הן הלוקין הבא על אחותו ועל אחות אביו ועל אחות אמו ועל אחות אשתו ועל אשת אחיו ועל אשת אחי אביו ועל הנדה

§ The mishna continues: Similarly, one who has forced relations with his sister, i. e., he rapes her, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife after they divorced, or with a menstruating woman, there is a fine paid. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from the following mishna ( Makkot 13a): And these people are flogged: One who has relations with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife, or with a menstruating woman. Anyone who intentionally has relations with any of these women is punished with lashes.