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ויליף סוף הקדש מתחילת הקדש מה תחילת הקדש יורש מימר אף סוף הקדש יורש סומך

And he derives the halakhot of the end of a consecrated animal from the initial consecration of the animal, as follows: Just as with regard to the initial state of consecration of the animal, an inheritor can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the end of the consecrated animal, an inheritor places his hands on its head.

רבי יהודה האי ואם המר ימיר מאי עביד ליה לרבות את האשה וכדתניא לפי שכל הענין כולו אינו מדבר אלא לשון זכר שנאמר לא יחליפנו ולא ימיר אתו אשה מנין תלמוד לומר ואם המר ימיר לרבות את האשה

The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an inheritor is not able to effect substitution, what does he do with this repetitive language in the verse:“ And if he shall at all substitute”? How does he interpret it? The Gemara answers: It serves to include a woman as able to effect substitution and to incur the penalty of forty lashes for doing so. And this is as it is taught in a baraita:

Since the verses concerning the entire matter of substitution speak only in the masculine, as it is stated: “ He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it” (Leviticus 27:10), from where is it derived that a woman is included? The verse states: “ And if he shall at all substitute, ” to include a woman.

ולרבי מאיר אשה מנא ליה נפקא ליה מואם ורבי יהודה ואם לא דריש

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Meir, who derives a different halakha from that verse, from where does he derive that a woman is included? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the addition of the conjunction“ and” in the verse:“ And if he shall at all substitute. ” And Rabbi Yehuda does not interpret the term“ and if” as having any special significance.

ובין רבי מאיר ובין רבי יהודה טעמא דרבי קרא לאשה הא לא רבייה קרא הוה אמינא כי עבדא תמורה לא לקיא והאמר רב יהודה אמר רב וכן תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם השוה הכתוב אשה לאיש לכל עונשין שבתורה

The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to both the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the reason why a woman is included is that the verse explicitly includes a woman, either by adding a conjunction or by repetition of the verb. The Gemara asks: Should one infer that if the verse did not include a woman, I would say that when a woman performs an act of substitution she is not flogged? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says, and so too the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that when the verse states:“ When a man or woman shall commit any sin that people commit” (Numbers 5:6), the verse equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishments of the Torah? Why, then, is there a need for the verse to include women in the prohibition against substitution?

איצטריך מהו דתימא הני מילי עונש דשוה בין ביחיד בין בצבור אבל הכא כיון דעונש שאינה שוה בכל הוא דתנן אין הצבור והשותפין עושין תמורה אשה נמי כי עבדא לא לקיא קא משמע לן

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to include women specifically, lest you say that this statement that equates women with men in general refers only to a punishment that applies equally to an individual and to the public. But here, since it is a punishment that does not apply equally to all, as we learned in a mishna (13a): The public and partners do not render an animal a substitute, one could claim that a woman as well, when she performs an act of substitution, is not flogged. The verse therefore teaches us that she is in fact liable.


בעי רמי בר חמא קטן מהו שימיר היכי דמי אילימא בקטן שלא הגיע לעונת נדרים לא תיבעי לך דכיון אקדושי לא אקדיש אמורי ממיר אלא כי קמבעיא ליה בקטן שהגיע לעונת נדרים

§ Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor, what is the halakha? Is he able to effect substitution or not? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances where this question arises? If we say that it is referring to a minor who has yet to reach the age of responsibility for his vows, i. e., twelve years and one day, you should not raise the dilemma, as since he cannot consecrate an animal by means of a vow, can he effect substitution? Rather, when he raises this dilemma, it is with regard to a minor who has reached the age of responsibility for his vows.

מי אמרינן כיון דאמר מר איש מה תלמוד לומר כי יפליא נדר לרבות מופלא הסמוך לאיש דקדשו קדוש מדאקדושי מקדיש אמורי נמי ממיר או דלמא כיון דלאו בר עונשין הוא בתמורה לא מיתפיס

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Do we say that a minor can effect substitution, since the Master said with regard to consecration: The verse states: “ When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 30:3). What is the meaning when the verse states the unusual formulation: Shall clearly utter [yafli] a vow, instead of the more conventional term: Shall take a vow [yiddor]? This serves to include a discriminating minor [mufla] on the brink of adulthood, teaching that his consecration takes effect. Perhaps, from the fact that he can consecrate an animal, he can also effect substitution. Or perhaps, since no minor is subject to punishments, he cannot apply sanctity to an animal by an act of substitution, which would incur a punishment.

אם תימצי לומר קטן עביד תמורה דהא אתי לכלל עונשין גוי מהו שימיר מי אמרת מדאקדושי מקדיש דתניא איש איש מה תלמוד לומר איש איש לרבות את הגוים שנודרים נדרים ונדבות כישראל אמורי נמי ממיר או דלמא כיון דלא אתי לכלל עונשין כי עביד תמורה לא קדשה

And even if you say that a minor can perform substitution, as he will come to an age when he is subject to punishments, what is the halakha as to whether a gentile can effect substitution? Do you say that he can do so from the fact that his consecration takes effect, as it is taught in a baraita:

The verse states:“ Any man [ish ish]… that brings his offering. ” What is the meaning when the verse states repetitivelyish ish”? This serves to include gentiles, teaching that they can take vows to bring vow offerings and gift offerings as a Jew can. Since the consecration of a gentile takes effect, perhaps he can effect substitution as well. Or perhaps, since he will not come to a time when he is subject to punishments, therefore when he performs an act of substitution, the animal is not consecrated.

אמר רבא תא שמע דתניא קדשי גוים לא נהנין ולא מועלין ואין חייבין עליהם משום פיגול נותר וטמא אין עושין תמורה ואין מביאין עליהם נסכים אבל קרבנו טעון נסכים דברי רבי שמעון

Rava says: Come and hear, as it is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Zevaḥim 5: 6): With regard to animals consecrated by gentiles, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property after the fact. And if one consumes them one is not liable for committing a transgression with regard to the prohibitions of piggul if they were sacrificed with the intent to consume them beyond their designated time, of notar if he consumed them beyond their designated time, and of consuming ritually impure offerings if he was impure. Gentiles cannot render a non-sacred animal a substitute for one they consecrate. And one does not bring libations for the offerings of a gentile as independent offerings, but his offering requires libations. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

אמר רבי יוסי בכולן אני רואה להחמיר במה דברים אמורים בקדשי מזבח אבל בקדשי בדק הבית מועלין בהן קתני מיהא אין עושין תמורה

Rabbi Yosei said: With regard to all of them I see fit to be stringent. In what case is this statement, that Rabbi Shimon exempts animals consecrated by gentiles from liability for misuse, said? It is said with regard to animals consecrated for the altar, i. e., offerings; but with regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property. Rava notes: In any event, the baraita teaches that gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute for his offering.

ורמי בר חמא בהקדיש גוי להתכפר גוי לא קמיבעיא לי כי קמיבעיא לי בהקדיש גוי ומתכפר בישראל בתר מקדיש אזלינן או בתר מתכפר אזלינן

The Gemara responds: And Rami bar Ḥama can say: I do not raise a dilemma in a case where a gentile consecrated an animal as an offering for a gentile such as himself to achieve atonement. In this case the baraita rules explicitly that he cannot effect substitution. When I raise the dilemma, it is in a case where a gentile consecrated an animal as an offering and a Jew achieves atonement with it. In this situation, do we follow the one who consecrated it, in which case the gentile cannot effect substitution, or do we follow the one achieving atonement, in which case he can?

תיפשוט ליה מדרבי אבהו דאמר רבי אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן המקדיש מוסיף חומש ומתכפר עושה תמורה והתורם משלו

The Gemara suggests: Solve this dilemma by invoking a statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one consecrates an animal as an offering to be brought by another, and the animal develops a blemish disqualifying it for sacrifice, if the one who consecrated it desires to redeem it, he adds one-fifth to its value, just as he would were it his own offering. By contrast, if the one achieving atonement with the offering desires to redeem it, he does not need to add one-fifth. But the one achieving atonement with the offering can render another animal a substitute for it as if he had consecrated it. And if one separates teruma, the portion of produce designated for a priest, from his own produce