דלמא רבי נתן היא דתניא רבי נתן אומר מנין לנושה בחבירו מנה וחבירו בחבירו מנין שמוציאין מזה ונותנין לזה תלמוד לומר ונתן לאשר אשם לו

However, this still does not prove conclusively that the baraita is corrupt, as perhaps it is the opinion of Rabbi Natan. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that in the case of one who claims one hundred dinars of another, and the other claims money of another, that one appropriates the money from this one, the last borrower, and gives it to this one, the first lender, without each party claiming the money from the one with whom he did business? The verse states: “ And he shall give it to him in respect of whom he has been guilty” (Numbers 5:7). The words“ whom he has been guilty” are expounded to mean that the borrower pays the one who is owed by his creditor, since the borrower is a party to this case despite the fact that he never incurred direct liability to him. It is possible to explain the baraita cited by Rav Yosef based on this reasoning as well.

אלא לא אשכחן תנא דמחמיר תרי חומרי בכתובה אלא אי כרבי מאיר אי כרבי נתן

Rather, a different justification exists for rejecting the baraita: We have not found a tanna who is stringent with these two stringencies with regard to a marriage contract. Rather, one rules either in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that movable property is mortgaged for a marriage contract, or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. No one accepts both of these stringencies, and yet this baraita can be explained only by a combination of the two opinions. It must therefore be rejected as non-authoritative.

אמר רבא אם כן היינו דשמענא ליה לאביי דאמר זו אינה משנה ולא ידענא מאי היא

Rava said: If so, that is the meaning of that which I heard from Abaye, who said: This is not a mishna, and I did not know what it is. Rava initially did not understand why the teaching should be dismissed, but he subsequently realizes what Abaye was say ing.

ההוא גברא דנפלה ליה יבמה במתא מחסיא בעא אחוה למיפסלה בגיטא מיניה אמר ליה מאי דעתיך אי משום נכסי אנא בנכסי פליגנא לך אמר ליה מסתפינא דעבדת לי כדעביד פומבדיתאה רמאה אמר ליה אי בעית פלוג לך מהשתא

The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who had a yevama happen before him for levirate marriage in the town of Mata Meḥasya, and his brother wanted to disqualify her from him by means of a bill of divorce. The man said to his brother: What is your opinion? Why are you doing this? If you are doing this due to the property of the dead brother, I will divide the property with you. The brother said to him: I am scared that you will do to me like the swindler from Pumbedita did, in the above story, when the man from Pumbedita promised he would share the inheritance and later retracted. The man said to him: If you wish, divide it for yourself from now. I am prepared for you to take the property already, although the acquisition will take effect only after I marry the yevama.

אמר מר בר רב אשי אף על גב דכי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן האומר לחבירו לך ומשוך פרה זו ולא תהיה קנויה לך אלא לאחר שלשים יום לאחר שלשים יום קנה ואפילו עומדת באגם

Mar bar Rav Ashi said that although when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of one who says to another: Go and pull this cow and it will be acquired for you only after thirty days, after thirty days he has acquired it through the act of pulling, and this is the halakha even if at the end of the thirty days the cow was standing in a meadow, i. e., a distant place that does not belong to the one acquiring the cow. This indicates that the present act of pulling is effective for later. Despite this halakha, Mar bar Rav Ashi claims that a difference exists between that case and the one currently under discussion.

התם בידו הכא לאו בידו

Mar bar Rav Ashi elaborates: There, with regard to the cow, it is in the seller’s power to transfer ownership at the present time, when the instruction to pull the cow is given, and therefore he can delay the acquisition. Here, however, it is not in his power to divide up the property, as he has yet to perform levirate marriage and the brother’s property does not belong to him. Consequently, he cannot transfer its ownership at the present time.

והא כי אתא רבין אמר רבי יוחנן לא קני לא קשיא הא דאמר ליה קני מעכשיו הא דלא אמר ליה קני מעכשיו

The Gemara asks: But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one is instructed to pull a cow, but the acquisition will take effect only after thirty days, he has not acquired it. This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own ruling. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this case, when one acquires it, is referring to a situation when he says to him: Acquire it from now, so that once thirty days have passed it should belong to him retroactively, but that case, when one does not acquire it, is when he did not say to him: Acquire it from now. If the acquisition does not take effect now, it cannot take effect later.

בעו מיניה מעולא יבם ואחר כך חילק מהו לא עשה ולא כלום חילק ואחר כך יבם מהו לא עשה ולא כלום

They inquired of Ulla: If the yavam performed levirate marriage with the woman and afterward divided the property he promised to share with his brother, what is the halakha? He replied: He has done nothing. They further asked: If he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, what is the halakha? He once again responded: He has done nothing.

מתקיף לה רב ששת השתא יבם ואחר כך חילק לא עשה ולא כלום חילק ואחר כך יבם מבעיא שני מעשים הוו

Rav Sheshet objects to this version of the discussion: Now if, when he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property when it was in his possession, Ulla answered that he has done nothing, then in a case where he divided it and afterward performed levirate marriage, is it necessary to inquire as to the halakha? It is obvious that such an action is of no consequence. The Gemara answers: Ulla was not asked these two questions on the same occasion. Rather, there were two incidents in which people raised these issues before Ulla, and he answered each inquiry separately.

כי אתא רבין אמר ריש לקיש בין יבם ואחר כך חילק בין חילק ואחר כך יבם לא עשה ולא כלום והלכתא לא עשה ולא כלום

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Reish Lakish said: Whether he performed levirate marriage and afterward divided the property, or whether he divided the property and afterward performed levirate marriage, he has done nothing. The Gemara concludes: And the practical halakha is that he has done nothing.

וחכמים אומרים פירות המחוברים לקרקע שלו אמאי והא כל נכסיו אחראין וערבאין לכתובתה אמר ריש לקיש תני שלה

§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: Produce that is attached to the ground is his. The Gemara asks: Why is this so? Doesn’t all of his property serve as a guarantee and security for her marriage contract? Reish Lakish said: Emend the text and teach: Produce that is attached to the ground is hers.

כנסה הרי היא כאשתו למאי הלכתא אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא לומר שמגרשה בגט ומחזירה מגרשה בגט פשיטא

The mishna further stated that if he married her, she is like his regular wife. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha was this stated? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The mishna means to say that he divorces her with a bill of divorce and that he may remarry her afterward without violating a prohibition. The Gemara asks: The halakha that he divorces her with a bill of divorce is obvious; how else can he divorce her?

מהו דתימא ויבמה אמר רחמנא ועדיין יבומין הראשונים עליה לא תיסגי לה בגט אלא בחליצה קא משמע לן

The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this lest you say that since the Merciful One states in the Torah: “ And he will take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:5), and here the status of the first levirate marriage is still upon her, this would mean that it should not suffice for her to leave by a bill of divorce, but rather she can leave him only by performing ḥalitza as well. The tanna therefore teaches us that ḥalitza is not required, as once he has married her she is like any other woman, who can be divorced by a bill of divorce alone.

מחזירה פשיטא

The Gemara asks with regard to the second part of the interpretation of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, that he may remarry her: It is obvious that he may remarry her if the couple chooses to do so.