ומנין שאף בשטר ודין הוא ומה כסף שאין מוציא מכניס שטר שמוציא אינו דין שמכניס

The baraita continues to discuss the modes of betrothal: And from where is it derived that a woman can be acquired even by means of a document? The Gemara answers: This is a logical derivation, made by an a fortiori inference: And if money, which does not release a woman from her husband, nevertheless can bring her into a husband’s domain by betrothal, is it not logical that a document, which releases a woman from her husband in the form of a bill of divorce, can bring her into a husband’s domain by betrothal?

מה לכסף שכן פודין בו הקדש ומעשר שני תאמר שטר שאין פודין בו הקדש ומעשר שני דכתיב ונתן הכסף וקם לו

The Gemara refutes this claim: What is unique about money is that it can effect acquisition in many contexts, as one can redeem with it consecrated property and second tithe. Will you say that the same also applies to a document, with which one cannot redeem consecrated property and second tithe? The proof that one may redeem consecrated property only by means of money is that it is written: “ And he will give the money and it will be assured to him” (see Leviticus 27: 19). Consequently, this halakha cannot be derived by logical reasoning.

אמר קרא ויצאה והיתה מקיש הויה ליציאה מה יציאה בשטר אף הויה נמי בשטר ואקיש נמי יציאה להויה מה הויה בכסף אף יציאה בכסף

Therefore, the verse states: “ And she leaves his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). This verse juxtaposes becoming, i. e., betrothal, to leaving, i. e., divorce. Just as leaving is performed through a document, i. e., a bill of divorce, so too, becoming can be performed through a document. The Gemara asks: And let one also juxtapose leaving to becoming, in the opposite direction: Just as becoming is performed through money, so too, leaving can be effected through money.

אמר אביי יאמרו כסף מכניס כסף מוציא סניגור יעשה קטיגור אי הכי שטר נמי יאמרו שטר מוציא שטר מכניס קטיגור יעשה סניגור

Abaye says: If so, people will say: Money brings in and money releases; if so, can an advocate [saneigor] become a prosecutor [kateigor]? It is improper for the same mode that draws man and woman together to be used for the termination of their relationship. The Gemara asks: If so, then with regard to a document too, they will say: A document brings in and a document releases; if so, can a prosecutor become an advocate?

מילי דהאי שטרא לחוד ומילי דהאי שטרא לחוד הכא נמי האי כספא לחוד והאי כספא לחוד טיבעא מיהא חד הוא

The Gemara answers: The words of this betrothal document are discrete, i. e., distinct, and the words of this divorce document are discrete, i. e., the two documents differ in content. The Gemara asks: Here too, this money is discrete and this money is discrete, as one coin is for the betrothal and a different coin is used for the divorce. The Gemara answers: In any event, the coin itself is one, i. e., there is no noticeable difference between the coin used for betrothal and one that would be used for divorce. The same cannot be said with regard to documents, as particular texts serve specific purposes, and the same document could not be used for both betrothal and divorce.

רבא אמר אמר קרא וכתב לה בכתיבה מתגרשת ואינה מתגרשת בכסף ואימא בכתיבה מתגרשת ואינה מתקדשת בכתיבה הא כתיב ויצאה והיתה מקיש וכו׳

Rava said: The halakha that a woman cannot be divorced by means of money is derived from a different source. The verse states: “ And he writes her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). This indicates that a woman is divorced only through writing and she is not divorced through money. The Gemara asks: But as this point is not stated explicitly and is inferred from the verse, one can instead say the following interpretation: She is divorced through writing, and she is not betrothed through writing. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. It is written: “ And she leaves and becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which juxtaposes betrothal to divorce, indicating that betrothal can be effected with a document.

ומה ראית מסתברא קאי בגירושין ממעט גירושין קאי בגירושין וממעט קידושין

The Gemara asks: And what did you see that you interpreted the verses in this manner? One can say the reverse, that the juxtaposition between betrothal and divorce teaches that in both cases money is effective, while the verse: “ And he writes her, ” means that she can be divorced but not betrothed through writing. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that when the verse is referring to divorce it excludes a different mode of divorce. Would a verse be referring to divorce and exclude a mode of betrothal?

ולרבי יוסי הגלילי דאפיק ליה להאי קרא לדרשא אחרינא שאינה מתגרשת בכסף מנא ליה אמר קרא ספר כריתת ספר כורתה ואין דבר אחר כורתה

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where does he derive that a woman cannot be divorced through money? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “ A scroll of severance, ” which teaches: A scroll, i. e., a written document, severs her from her husband, and nothing else severs her from him.

ורבנן האי כריתת מאי עבדי ליה מיבעי ליה לדבר הכורת בינו לבינה

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, what do they do with this verse: “ A scroll of severance”? How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: They require it for the halakha that a document of divorce must be a matter that entirely severs him from her. The text of the bill of divorce must completely terminate the relationship between them.

כדתניא הרי זה גיטיך על מנת שלא תשתי יין על מנת שלא תלכי לבית אביך לעולם אין זה כריתות כל שלשים יום הרי זה כריתות

This is as it is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Gittin 5: 12) that if a husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not ever drink wine, or: On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not an act of severance, as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for thirty days, that is an act of severance. The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.

ורבי יוסי הגלילי מכרת כריתת קא נפקא ליה ורבנן כרת כריתת לא משמע להו

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this requirement that a bill of divorce must completely sever the ties between husband and wife? The Gemara answers that he derives it from the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i. e., karet, but rather its conjugate, keritut. This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: And what do the other Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: They do not interpret the distinction between karet and keritut.

חדא מחדא לא אתיא תיתי חדא מתרתי הי תיתי לא ליכתוב רחמנא בשטר ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן הנאתן מרובה

§ The Gemara asks: It has been shown that one mode of betrothal cannot be derived from another mode of betrothal, as explained in the baraita, but why not let one be derived from the other two methods? The Gemara answers: This is not possible, as, which method will be derived from the others? If you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be betrothed through a document, and one can derive this mode of acquisition from these modes of acquisition, i. e., intercourse and money, this claim can be refuted. What is unique about these other modes is that their benefit is great, relative to a document, as a woman experiences no enjoyment upon receiving a document.

לא ניכתוב רחמנא בביאה ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן קנינן מרובה

And if you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be acquired through sexual intercourse, and one can derive this mode from these modes of acquisition, i. e., money and a document, this too is not possible, as, what is unique about these modes of betrothal is that their acquisition is great. In other words, these modes of acquisition apply in many other situations. Therefore, one cannot derive the unusual acquisition of sexual intercourse from these methods.

לא ניכתוב רחמנא בכסף ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן ישנן בעל כרחה

If you say: Let the Merciful One not write that a woman can be acquired through money, and one can derive this mode from these other modes of acquisition, this is also not possible, as what is unique about these is that they apply against her will. A yavam acquires a yevama through intercourse even against her will, while a document releases a woman from marriage without her consent in the case of a bill of divorce.

וכי תימא כסף נמי בעל כרחה באמה העבריה באישות מיהא לא אשכחן

And if you would say that money also applies against her will, in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, whose father can sell her to a master without her consent, enabling one to therefore derive from the other two modes of acquisition, i. e., intercourse and a document, that a woman can be acquired through money, this opinion can be refuted as well: In any event, with regard to marriage, we do not find a case in which a woman can be acquired through money against her will. Consequently, none of these modes of acquisition can be derived from any of the others.

אמר רב הונא חופה קונה מקל וחומר ומה כסף שאינו מאכיל בתרומה קונה חופה שמאכלת בתרומה אינו דין שתקנה

§ Rav Huna says: The ceremony of the wedding canopy effects acquisition of the woman, as is derived through an a fortiori inference: If money, which does not enable the wife to partake of teruma, as the daughter of a non-priest betrothed to a priest may not yet partake of teruma, effects acquisition of a woman for betrothal, is it not logical that a wedding canopy, which enables her to partake of teruma, as once a woman has entered the wedding canopy it is permitted for her to partake of teruma due to her husband the priest, should also effect acquisition of a woman by her husband?

וכסף אינו מאכיל והאמר עולא דבר תורה ארוסה בת ישראל אוכלת בתרומה שנאמר וכהן כי יקנה נפש קנין כספו והאי קנין כספו הוא

The Gemara asks: And does betrothal money not enable a woman to partake of teruma? But didn’t Ulla say: By Torah law the daughter of a non-priest who is betrothed to a priest may partake of teruma immediately upon her betrothal, as it is stated: “ But if a priest buy any soul, the acquisition of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), and this woman is considered the acquisition of his money.

ומה טעם אמרו אינה אוכלת גזירה שמא ימזגו לה כוס בבית אביה ותשקנו לאחיה ולאחותיה

And what is the reason that the Sages said that she may not partake of teruma? It is a rabbinic decree lest they pour her a cup of teruma wine in her father’s house, where she is staying before her marriage, and she give to her brothers and sisters to drink, as it is prohibited for them to partake of teruma. If so, by Torah law a woman may partake of teruma once she has been betrothed with money. Consequently, the above a fortiori inference that entering a wedding canopy can effect betrothal is invalid.

אלא פריך הכי ומה כסף שאינו גומר קונה

Rather, the Gemara emends Rav Huna’s statement and says that he refutes the opinion that entering a wedding canopy does not effect betrothal as follows: If money, which does not complete the acquisition of a woman, as a young woman remains under her father’s authority with regard to certain issues, nevertheless effects acquisition of her for the stage of betrothal,