שזרע כרמו של חבירו סמדר ובא מעשה לפני חכמים ואסרו את הזרעים והתירו את הגפנים ואמאי לימא קל וחומר הוא ומה האוסר אינו נאסר הבא לאסור ולא אסר אינו דין שלא יתאסר

who planted seeds in the vineyard of an another when the grapes on the vines were budding, and the incident came before the Sages and they deemed the seeds prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, but they deemed the vines permitted. The Gemara continues: But why did they deem the seeds prohibited? Let the Sages say through an analogous a fortiori inference that the seeds should be permitted: And if that which renders an item prohibited, i. e., the vine, which causes the seeds to be prohibited, is itself not prohibited, then with regard to the seeds, which come to render the vines prohibited but did not render the vines prohibited, is it not logical that they should not be rendered prohibited?

הכי השתא התם קנבוס ולוף אסרה תורה דתנן היתה שדהו זרועה קנבוס ולוף לא יהא זורע על גביהם שהן עושות לשלש שנים שאר זרעים מדרבנן הוא דאסירי האי דעביד איסורא קנסוה רבנן האי דלא עביד איסורא לא קנסוה רבנן אבל הכא לימא קל וחומר

The Gemara rejects the comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the baraita, only hemp and arum are prohibited by Torah law to be sown in a vineyard, as we learned in a mishna ( Kilayim 2: 5): If one’s field was sown with hemp and arum, he should not sow above them, as they produce a yield only once every three years. Other seeds are prohibited by rabbinic law. Therefore, with regard to this person who committed a transgression by planting the seeds in the vineyard of another, the Sages penalized him and deemed his seeds prohibited, but as for that person who did not commit a transgression, i. e., the owner of the vineyard, the Sages did not penalize him. But here, in the case of piggul, which is a biblical prohibition, let us say such an a fortiori inference.

ואיכא דמתני לה אכבשים בעא מיניה רבי אלעזר מרב השוחט את הכבשים לאכול כזית מהן ומלחמן מהו

And there are those who teach the dilemma of Rabbi Elazar with regard to the lambs brought with the two loaves, and not with regard to a thanks offering. Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: In a case where one slaughters the lambs with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from them and from their loaves the next day, what is the halakha?

לאיפגולי כבשים לא קא מיבעיא לי השתא כולו מלחם לא מפגלי מהן ומלחמן מיבעיא כי קא מיבעיא לי לאיפגולי לחם מי מצטרפי כבשים לאיפגולי ללחם או לא

Rabbi Elazar elaborated: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to rendering the lambs piggul for the following reason: Now that in a case where his intent was to consume an entire olive-bulk from the loaves alone, the lambs are not rendered piggul, as the mishna teaches that piggul intent with regard to the loaves does not render the lambs piggul, then in a case where his intent is to consume half an olive-bulk from them and half an olive-bulk from their loaves, is it necessary to teach that the lambs are not piggul? Rather, when I raised the dilemma, it was with regard to rendering the loaves piggul. Does his intention with regard to the lambs combine with his intention with regard to the loaves to render the loaves piggul or not?

אמר ליה אף בזו הלחם מפוגל והכבשים אינן מפוגלין ואמאי לימא קל וחומר ומה המפגל אינו מתפגל הבא לפגל ולא פיגל אינו דין שלא יתפגל

Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: Even in this case, the loaves are rendered piggul and the lambs are not rendered piggul. The Gemara asks: But why should the loaves be rendered piggul? Let us say the following a fortiori inference: And if that which renders an item piggul, i. e., the lambs, since it is maintained that intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the lambs assists to render the loaves piggul, is itself not rendered piggul, then with regard to the loaves, which come to render the lambs piggul, but do not render them piggul, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the loaves does not combine with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the lambs to render them piggul, is it not logical that the loaves themselves should not be rendered piggul?

ומי אמרינן קל וחומר כי האי גונא והתניא מעשה באחד שזרע כרמו של חבירו סמדר וכו׳ ואמאי לימא קל וחומר מה האוסר אינו נאסר הבא לאסור ולא אסר אינו דין שלא יתאסר

The Gemara asks: And do we say an a fortiori inference of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that there was an incident involving one who planted seeds in the vineyard of his friend when the grapes on the vines were budding, and the incident came before the Sages and they deemed the seeds prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, but they deemed the vines permitted. The Gemara continues: But why did they deem the seeds prohibited? Let the Sages say through an analogous a fortiori inference that the seeds should be permitted: And if that which renders an item prohibited, i. e., the vine, which causes the seeds to be prohibited, is itself not prohibited, then with regard to the seeds, which come to render the vines prohibited but did not render the vines prohibited, is it not logical that they should not be rendered prohibited?

הכי השתא התם קנבוס ולוף אסרה תורה שאר זרעים מדרבנן הוא דאסירי האי דעבד איסורא קנסוה רבנן דלא עבד איסורא לא קנסוה רבנן אבל הכא לימא קל וחומר

The Gemara rejects the comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the baraita, only hemp and arum are prohibited by Torah law to be sown in a vineyard. Other seeds are prohibited by rabbinic law. Therefore, with regard to this person who committed a transgression by planting the seeds in the vineyard of another, the Sages penalized him and deemed his seeds prohibited, but as for this person who did not commit a transgression, i. e., the owner of the vineyard, the Sages did not penalize him. But here, in the case of piggul, which is a biblical prohibition, let us say such an a fortiori inference.

מאן דמתני לה אתודה כל שכן אכבשים ומאן דמתני לה אכבשים כבשים הוא דהוזקקו זה לזה לתנופה אבל תודה דלא הוזקקה זה לזה בתנופה לא

The Gemara notes: The one who teaches that the dilemma of Rabbi Elazar was raised with regard to the thanks offering and the accompanying loaves, all the more so will hold that the dilemma may be raised with regard to the case of the lambs brought with the two loaves on Shavuot . But the one who teaches that Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma was raised with regard to the lambs and the two loaves, it is possible that he holds that the dilemma was raised only with regard to the lambs and the two loaves, as they were bound to one another by waving, since the priest waves the lambs and loaves together (see Leviticus 23: 20). But with regard to a thanks offering and its loaves, as they were not bound to one another by waving, the dilemma was not raised, since it is obvious in this case that his intentions do not combine.

רבי אבא זוטי בעי לה הכי בעא מיניה רבי אלעזר מרב השוחט את הכבש לאכול כזית מחבירו למחר מהו חבירו כבש משמע ולא מפגל או דלמא לחם משמע ומפגל ליה

Rabbi Abba the small taught that Rabbi Elazar raises the dilemma in this manner: Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: If one slaughters one of the lambs brought on Shavuot with the two loaves intending to consume an olive-bulk from the other the next day, what is the halakha? When this individual thinks of the other, does he mean the other lamb, and if so, the lamb is not rendered piggul, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul? Or perhaps when this individual thinks of the other he means the other part of the offering, i. e., the two loaves, and if so his intention renders it piggul, as taught in the mishna.

אמר ליה תניתוה שחט אחד מן הכבשים לאכול ממנו למחר הוא פיגול וחבירו כשר לאכול מחבירו למחר שניהם כשרים אלמא חבירו כבש משמע דלמא דפריש ואמר חבירו כבש

Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: You learned in a mishna (16a): If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is piggul and the other is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor piggul. Rav concludes: Evidently, in this context the term: The other, means the other lamb. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the mishna is discussing a case where he clarifies and says: The other lamb, but the mishna is not referring to a case where he merely thought: The other.

מתני׳ הזבח מפגל את הנסכים משקדשו בכלי דברי רבי מאיר הנסכים אינן מפגלים את הזבח כיצד השוחט את הזבח לאכול ממנו למחר הוא ונסכיו מפוגלין להקריב נסכיו למחר הנסכים מפוגלין הזבח אינו מפוגל

MISHNA: The animal offering renders the accompanying libations and meal offerings piggul from the moment that they were consecrated in the vessel, but not before; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The libations do not render the animal offering piggul. How so? In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and its libations are rendered piggul. But if one slaughters the offering with the intent to sacrifice its libations the next day, the libations are rendered piggul, while the offering is not piggul.

גמ׳ תנו רבנן נסכי בהמה חייבין עליהן משום פיגול מפני שדם הזבח מתירן לקרב דברי רבי מאיר

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita:

With regard to the libations of an animal offering, one is liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of piggul, as the blood of the offering permits them to be offered on the altar, and any item that becomes permitted for consumption or for sacrifice through a permitting factor can be rendered piggul, and one who partakes of such an item after its permitting factors were sacrificed is liable to receive karet. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

אמרו לו לרבי מאיר והלא אדם מביא זבחו היום ונסכיו עד עשרה ימים אמר להן אף אני לא אמרתי אלא בבאין עם הזבח אמרו לו אפשר לשנותו לזבח אחר

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his offering today and the accompanying libations from now until even ten days later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: I, too, spoke only about libations that come to be sacrificed together with the offering and were already sanctified in a service vessel for that purpose. The Rabbis said to him: But it is possible to switch the libations for use with another offering. Clearly, then, they are not considered an indispensable part of that offering.

אמר רבא קסבר רבי מאיר הוקבעו בשחיטה כלחמי תודה

Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the libations are fixed to this particular offering at the time of its slaughter, and one may not use them with another offering. Accordingly, these libations are rendered piggul on account of intent during the slaughter of the offering, just like the loaves of a thanks offering, which are fixed to a particular thanks offering upon its slaughter and become piggul on account of intent during the slaughter of that particular thanks offering.

תנו רבנן לוג שמן של מצורע חייבין עליו משום פיגול מפני שדם אשם מתירו לבהונות דברי רבי מאיר אמרו לו לרבי מאיר והלא אדם מביא אשמו היום ולוגו מיכן ועד עשרה ימים

In a similar vein, the Sages taught: With regard to the log of oil of the leper (see Leviticus 14: 10–20), one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became piggul, as the blood of the offering permits it to be placed on the right thumb and big toe of the leper. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his guilt offering today and the accompanying log of oil from now until even ten days later. Evidently, the log of oil is not considered part of the guilt offering, and therefore it should not be rendered piggul on account of it.

אמר להן אף אני לא אמרתי אלא בבא עם האשם אפשר לשנותו לאשם אחר אמר רבא קסבר רבי מאיר הוקבעו בשחיטה כלחמי תודה

Rabbi Meir said to them: I, too, spoke only about a log of oil that comes with the guilt offering. The Rabbis said to him: But even in this case, the oil should not be considered part of the offering, as it is possible to switch the oil for use with another guilt offering. Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the log of oil is fixed to this particular guilt offering at the time of its slaughter and is therefore rendered piggul on account of it, just like the loaves of a thanks offering, as the slaughter of the thanks offering fixes the accompanying loaves to that particular offering.