אמר רבי יוחנן הניח בשר על גבי גחלים היפך בו חייב לא היפך בו פטור

that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat to its other side, so that both sides were roasted, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. But if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt, as the meat is considered cooked only if both sides were roasted. If so, the same should apply to one who places leaven on the dough of a meal offering: He should be liable only if he turns the dough over. This contradicts the ruling of Rabbi Ami.

אמר רבא מאי חייב נמי דקאמר כמעשה צלי של שבת

Rava said: What does Rabbi Yoḥanan, as well, mean when he says: He is liable to receive lashes for it, similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat? He means that one who places leaven on the dough of a meal offering, even if he does not turn it over, is similar to one who performs a prohibited action of roasting on Shabbat, meaning that he is similar to one who turned over the roasting food on the coals.

גופא אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן הניח בשר על גבי גחלים היפך בו חייב לא היפך בו פטור היכי דמי אילימא דאי לא היפך ביה לא בשיל פשיטא אלא דאי לא מהפיך ליה נמי הוה בשיל אמאי לא מיחייב

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat he is liable for cooking on Shabbat, and if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that this was a situation where if he does not turn over the meat it would not cook, then it is obvious that if he does not turn it over he is exempt. Rather, it must be referring to a case where even if he does not turn over the meat it would nevertheless cook. But if so, why isn’t he liable for merely placing the meat on the coals, despite the fact that he did not turn it over?

לא צריכא דאי לא היפך ביה הוה בשיל מצד אחד כמאכל בן דרוסאי וכי מהפיך ביה בשיל משני צדדין כמאכל בן דרוסאי וקא משמע לן דכל מצד אחד כמאכל בן דרוסאי לא כלום הוא

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where if he does not turn over the meat it would cook on one side only partially, roughly one-third of the ordinary process of cooking, like the food of ben Derosai. And now that he turns it over, it cooks on both sides like the food of ben Derosai. And Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that any meat roasted on only one side like the food of ben Derosai is nothing, i. e., this is not a violation of the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat. If it was roasted on both sides like the food of ben Derosai this is classified as cooking, and he is liable for cooking on Shabbat.

אמר רבא ואם נצלה בו כגרוגרת מצד אחד במקום אחד חייב אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי במקום אחד אין בשנים או שלשה מקומות לא והתנן הקודח כל שהוא חייב

The Gemara continues to discuss the case of meat roasted on one side on Shabbat. Rava says: And if a quantity of that meat equivalent in volume to a fig-bulk was fully roasted on one side of the meat and the roasted area was in one spot on the piece of meat, while the rest of the meat remained raw, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: It can be inferred from Rava’s statement that if the fig-bulk of meat that was roasted was in one spot, yes, he is liable, whereas if the amount of the fig-bulk was distributed over two or three separate spots he is not liable. But didn’t we learn in a mishna ( Shabbat 102b): One who drills a hole of any size is liable for the labor of building or the labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel?

היכי דמי אילימא במקום אחד כל שהוא למאי חזי אלא לאו בשנים או שלשה מקומות דחזו לצירוף לא לעולם במקום אחד דחזו לבבא דאקלידא

The Gemara analyzes that mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that the mishna is referring to one who drills a hole in one spot alone, why is he liable? For what purpose is a hole of any size, which includes a very small hole, fit to be used? Rather, is it not referring to one who drills holes in two or three different spots, and the reason he is liable is that these holes are fit to be joined? Builders who require a large hole will often start by drilling a few small holes which they later enlarge and join together. By the same logic, if the meat was roasted in a few spots he should be liable, as these can join together. The Gemara answers: No; actually the mishna is referring to one who drills in only one spot, as one can say that the hole is fit as an entrance [levava] for the placement of the tooth of a key [aklida], which is very small.

ואיכא דאמרי אמר רבא אפילו בשנים ושלשה מקומות אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי אף אנן נמי תנינא הקודח כל שהוא חייב היכי דמי אילימא במקום אחד כל שהוא למאי חזי אלא לאו בשנים ושלשה מקומות דחזי לצירוף לא לעולם במקום אחד דחזו לבבא דאקלידא

And there are those who say there is a different version of this discussion: Rava says: Even if the fig-bulk of the meat that was fully roasted on only one side was distributed over two or three separate spots, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: We learn this halakha in the mishna as well: One who drills a hole of any size is liable. What are the circumstances? If we say that the hole is in one spot alone, why is he liable? For what purpose is a hole of any size fit to be used? Rather, is it not referring to one who drills holes in two or three different spots, and the reason he is liable is that these holes are fit to be joined? Similarly, in the case discussed by Rava, one is liable for the cooking of the meat in a few different spots which can join together. The Gemara answers: No; actually the mishna is referring to one who drills in only one spot, as one can say that it is fit as an entrance for the placement of the tooth of a key.

תנו רבנן אילו נאמר אשר תקריבו לה׳ לא תעשה חמץ הייתי אומר אין לי בלא תעשה חמץ אלא קומץ בלבד

§ The Gemara returns to discussing the prohibition against leavening a meal offering. The Sages taught in a baraita:

Concerning the deep-pan meal offering, the verse states: “ No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). The term“ meal offering” is apparently superfluous, and therefore the baraita explains: If the verse had stated only: Nothing that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven, I would say: I have derived only that the handful removed from the meal offering for burning on the altar alone is included in the prohibition:“ Shall not be made with leaven, ” as only the handful is burned on the altar.

מנחה מנין תלמוד לומר מנחה שאר מנחות מנין תלמוד לומר כל המנחה

From where is it derived that one is liable for the leavening of a meal offering whose handful has not yet been removed? The verse states: “ Meal offering, ” to teach that the prohibition includes a meal offering before the removal of its handful. The Gemara asks: Since this verse is stated in the context of the deep-pan meal offering, from where is it derived that one is liable for leavening the other meal offerings, which are not mentioned in this passage? Therefore, the verse states the inclusive phrase:“ No meal offering, ” to apply this halakha to other meal offerings.

אשר תקריבו לה׳ כשרה ולא פסולה מכאן אמרו המחמיץ את הכשירה חייב ואת הפסולה פטור

The baraita continues to expound the verse. The phrase: “ That you shall bring to the Lord, ” indicates that this prohibition applies only to a fit meal offering, but not to a disqualified meal offering, e. g., a meal offering that was taken outside the Temple or that was rendered ritually impure. From here the Sages stated that one who leavens a fit meal offering is liable to receive lashes, but one who leavens a disqualified meal offering is exempt.

בעי רב פפא חימצה ויצאת וחזר וחימצה מהו כיון דיצאת איפסילה לה ביוצא וכי הדר מחמיץ לה לא מיחייב עלה משום מחמיץ אחר מחמיץ

With regard to the ruling that the prohibition against leavening does not apply to a disqualified meal offering, Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one leavened a meal offering when it was fit, and subsequently someone removed the meal offering and it emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, and he again leavened it, what is the halakha? Is he liable for the second leavening as well? The Gemara explains the possibilities: Does one say that since it emerged it is disqualified in accordance with the status of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area, and therefore when he again leavens it he is not liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it?

או דילמא כיון דחימצה פסול יוצא לא מהני ביה וכי הדר מחמיץ לה מיחייב עלה משום מחמיץ אחר מחמיץ תיקו

Or perhaps, since one already leavened the meal offering, from this point forward the disqualification of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area is ineffective with regard to removing it from the prohibition against leavening, as the prohibition against emerging from the Temple itself applies only to a fit meal offering. And therefore, when he again leavens it he is liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

בעי רב מרי חימצה בראשו של מזבח מהו אשר תקריבו אמר רחמנא והא אקרבה

Rav Mari raises another dilemma concerning the leavening of a meal offering. If a priest leavened a meal offering while standing at the top of the altar, what is the halakha? The Gemara clarifies the possibilities: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “ No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), which indicates that this prohibition applies only to a meal offering that has not yet been brought to the Lord, i. e., to the altar. And therefore, as this meal offering has already been brought to the top of the altar, even though it has not yet been burned, perhaps it is not included in the prohibition.

או דלמא מחוסר הקטרה כמחוסר מעשה דמי תיקו

Or perhaps any offering whose burning has not yet been performed is considered like one whose action of sacrifice has not yet been performed, despite the fact that it has already been brought to the top of the altar. If so, this meal offering is included in the prohibition against leavening. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

והשתא דנפקא ליה מכל המנחה אשר תקריבו (לה׳) למה לי מיבעי ליה לכדתניא אשר תקריבו לרבות מנחת נסכים לחימוץ דברי רבי יוסי הגלילי רבי עקיבא אומר לרבות לחם הפנים לחימוץ

The Gemara asks: And now that the tanna of the baraita derives from the phrase:“ No meal offering, ” that the prohibition includes even a meal offering before the removal of its handful, why do I need the phrase:“ That you shall bring, ” in the same verse? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita:

The verse states:“ That you shall bring, ” in order to include the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany certain animal offerings such as burnt offerings, peace offerings, and the sin offerings and guilt offerings of a leper in the prohibition against leavening. Unlike the standard meal offerings, from which a handful is removed, these are entirely burned upon the altar, and the additional derivation is necessary to include them in the prohibition against leavening. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This phrase serves to include the shewbread in the prohibition against leavening.

מנחת נסכים מי פירות הם

The Gemara clarifies these opinions: With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the Gemara asks: How is it possible to leaven the meal offering brought with libations? This type of meal offering is kneaded only with olive oil, which is a type of fruit juice,