בעי רב יוסף אין חרישה בשבת מהו מי אמרינן כיון דקא מודו בכולהו מלתא כביטול מקצת וקיום מקצת דמי או דלמא כיון דקא עקריין ליה לחרישה כל עיקר כעקירת גוף דמי

§ Apropos the ruling of a court to nullify a mitzva, Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: If the court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against plowing on Shabbat, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that since the judges agree to the application of the entire matter of prohibitions on Shabbat and their ruling is exclusively with regard to plowing, its status is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the judges are abolishing the principal category of labor of plowing in its entirety, it is tantamount to abolishing the essence of the mitzva of Shabbat.

תא שמע יש נדה בתורה אבל הבא על שומרת יום כנגד יום פטור ואמאי הא עקריין לשומרת יום כנגד יום כל עיקר

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge, in its entirety? Apparently, nullification of one category of halakha in a mitzva is not tantamount to abolition of the essence of an entire mitzva.

אמר לך רב יוסף שומרת יום דקאמרין כדשנין

The Gemara rejects this: Rav Yosef could say to you: The ruling concerning a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is as we stated, as we explained earlier. The reference is not to abolition of the entire halakha of the woman who observes a day for a day, but rather to a case where the judges ruled that the initial stage of intercourse is permitted.

תא שמע יש שבת בתורה אבל המוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים פטור ואמאי הא עקריין להוצאה כל עיקר

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of the principal category of labor of carrying out in its entirety?

התם נמי כדשנין

The Gemara rejects this: That too is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only a portion of the labor, e. g., throwing or passing an item from domain to domain.

תא שמע יש עבודה זרה בתורה אבל המשתחוה פטור אמאי והא עקריין להשתחויה כל עיקר

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt. And why should the court be liable in that case? But didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of bowing in its entirety?

אמרי השתחויה נמי כדשנין

The Sages say: Bowing, too, is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only an aspect of bowing, not to abolish the prohibition against bowing in its entirety.

בעי רבי זירא אין שבת בשביעית מהו במאי טעו בהדין קרא בחריש ובקציר תשבת בזמן דאיכא חרישה איכא שבת ובזמן דליכא חרישה ליכא שבת

Apropos rulings to nullify a mitzva or part of a mitzva, Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, what is the halakha? Before seeking to resolve that dilemma, the Gemara asks: With regard to what matter did they err that resulted in that ruling? They erred with regard to this verse written with regard to Shabbat:“ In plowing and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), which the judges interpreted to mean: During a time when there is plowing, i. e., in all years of the Sabbatical cycle other than the Sabbatical Year, there is a prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. But during a time when there is no plowing, i. e., during the Sabbatical Year, there is no prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat.

מי אמרינן כיון דמקיימין לה בשאר שני שבוע כביטול מקצת וקיום מקצת דמי או דלמא כיון דקא עקריין ליה בשביעית כעקירת הגוף דמי

The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma. Do we say: Since one fulfills the mitzva of Shabbat during the rest of the years of the Sabbatical cycle, nullifying Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the court is abolishing Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to abolishing the entire essence of the mitzva?

אמר רבינא תא שמע נביא שנתנבא לעקור דבר מדברי תורה חייב לביטול מקצת ולקיום מקצת רבי שמעון אומר פטור ובעבודה זרה אפילו אמר היום עובדה ולמחר בטלה חייב שמע מינה אין שבת בשביעית כביטול מקצת וקיום מקצת דמי שמע מינה

Ravina said: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: In the case of a prophet who prophesies to abolish a matter of the matters of the Torah, he is deemed a false prophet and is liable to be executed through strangulation. If he prophesies for the nullification of part and the fulfillment of part of a matter in the Torah, Rabbi Shimon says he is exempt from execution. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and revoke its status tomorrow, everyone agrees that he is liable, as with regard to idol worship, even a ruling to nullify part of the mitzva involves a severe prohibition. Learn from it that in a case where a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it.

מתני׳ הורו בית דין וידע אחד מהן שטעו ואמר להן טועין אתם או שלא היה מופלא של בית דין שם או שהיה אחד מהן גר או ממזר או נתין או זקן שלא ראוי לבנים הרי זה פטור

MISHNA: If the court issued a ruling, and one of the judges knew that they erred and he said to them: You are mistaken; or if the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court was not there for that session of the Sanhedrin, or if one of the judges was disqualified from serving as a judge, e. g., because he was a convert, or a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer], or a Gibeonite, or an old man no longer able to father children, this court is exempt, because they have not rendered a full-fledged ruling.

שנאמר כאן עדה ונאמר להלן עדה מה עדה האמורה להלן כולן ראוין להוראה אף עדה האמורה כאן עד שיהיו כולן ראוין להוראה

This is derived by means of a verbal analogy, as“ assembly” is stated here with regard to a court that issues an erroneous ruling: “ And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13), and“ assembly” is stated there with regard to the halakha of one who commits murder unwittingly: “ And the assembly shall judge between the one who struck and the blood redeemer” (Numbers 35:24). Just as in the“ assembly” stated there, with regard to the unwitting murderer, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, so too, in the“ assembly” stated here, with regard to the court that issued an erroneous ruling; the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings.

גמ׳ או שלא היה מופלא של בית דין שם מנלן אמר רב ששת וכן תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל מפני מה אמרו הורו בדבר שהצדוקין מודין בו פטורין מפני שהיה להם ללמוד ולא למדו לא היה מופלא של בית דין שם נמי פטורין מפני שהיה להם ללמוד ולא למדו

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: Or if the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the court is exempt. From where do we derive this halakha? Rav Sheshet said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason did the Sages say: If the court issued a ruling with regard to a matter with which the Sadducees agree, the judges are exempt? It is due to the fact that it was incumbent upon them to learn that halakha that is written explicitly in the Torah, and they did not learn it. Similarly, in a case where the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the judges are also exempt, as it was incumbent upon them to learn and they did not learn.

נאמר שם עדה ונאמר כאן עדה עד שיהו כולן ראוין להוראה והתם מנלן דאמר רב חסדא אמר קרא והתיצבו שם עמך עמך בדומין לך

The mishna teaches: “ Assembly” is stated there and“ assembly” is stated here… the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings. The Gemara asks: And there, from where do we derive that all the judges must be fit to issue rulings? The Gemara answers that this is as Rav Ḥisda says that the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders:“ That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term“ with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, in the sense that they must be fit to issue rulings.

ואימא עמך לשכינה אלא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר קרא ונשאו אתך אתך בדומין לך

The Gemara challenges: And say that the term“ with you, ” means that they shall be like Moses in that they will all be fit for the Divine Presence to rest upon them. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that it is derived as the verse states in the context of the advice that Yitro gave to Moses: “ And they shall judge the people at all times…and ease your burden from upon you and bear it with you” (Exodus 18:22).“ With you” is interpreted to mean: Similar to you.

מתני׳ הורו בית דין שוגגין ועשו כל הקהל שוגגין מביאין פר מזידין ועשו שוגגין מביאין כשבה ושעירה שוגגין ועשו מזידין הרי אלו פטורין

MISHNA: If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling unwittingly and the entire congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of their ruling, the court brings a bull, as it is stated in the Torah with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, as they knew that their ruling was incorrect, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the congregation brings a female lamb or a female goat as an individual sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, i. e., with the knowledge that the ruling of the court was erroneous, these people are exempt from bringing an offering.

גמ׳ שוגגין ועשו מזידין הרי אלו פטורין הא שוגג דומיא דמזיד חייב והיכי דמי שהורו בית דין שחלב מותר ונתחלף לו בשומן ואכלו

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, these people are exempt. The Gemara infers: But if the person performed a transgression unwittingly in a manner similar to that of an intentional transgression, the court is liable. And what are the circumstances of that performance? It is a case where the court issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for a person with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat.

לימא תפשוט הא דבעי רמי בר חמא אמר לך משום דתנא רישא מזידין ועשו שוגגין תנא סיפא שוגגין ועשו מזידין

The Gemara suggests: If so, let us say: Resolve from here that which Rami bar Ḥama raises as a dilemma (2a) with regard to this case, a dilemma that remained unresolved. The Gemara rejects this: Rami bar Ḥama could say to you that the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this inference, as due to the fact that the tanna taught the first clause of the mishna: If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly, he taught the latter clause employing a similar style: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally.

מתני׳ הורו בית דין ועשו כל הקהל או רובן על פיהן מביאין פר ובעבודה זרה מביאין פר ושעיר דברי רבי מאיר רבי יהודה אומר שנים עשר שבטים מביאין שנים עשר פרים ובעבודה זרה מביאין שנים עשר פרים ושנים עשר שעירים

MISHNA: If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling and the entire congregation or a majority thereof performed a transgression on the basis of their ruling, the judges bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering. And if the erroneous ruling involved idol worship, the judges bring a bull and a goat, as it is written in the Torah (see Numbers 15: 24); this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not the court that brings the offering, it is the people. Twelve tribes, each of which performed a transgression, bring twelve bulls, i. e., each tribe brings one, and for idol worship they bring twelve bulls and twelve goats, as each tribe is a congregation.